Standing Committee E

[Mr. Peter Atkinson in the Chair]

Communications Bill

Clause 355 - Matters in relation to which OFCOM have competition functions

Andrew Lansley: I beg to move amendment No. 677, in
clause 355, page 306, line 39, leave out subsections (2) and (3).
 I am trying to address the Minister, but I am looking straight into the sun—a cunning Government ploy on his part. 
 As we turn into the home straight, we come to what I hope will not be a minority pursuit. Before we discuss the next four clauses on concurrent powers, I should say that there is very little disagreement about the desirability of the concurrency of powers. If the amendments seem somewhat detailed, the Minister will understand that it is simply because we are trying to make sure not only that the provisions are implemented accurately, but that they can be understood. We may be doing more of the latter than the former. 
 The amendment relates to the definition of the matters in relation to which Ofcom will have competition functions concurrently with the Office of Fair Trading. Let us consider other legislation, including telecommunications legislation. The Director General of Telecommunications, or Oftel, has concurrent powers with the Office of Fair Trading in relation to the Competition Act 1998. The matters in relation to which they have concurrent powers are defined in several statutes. In the case of Oftel and the Telecommunications Act 1984, those matters are referred to as: 
''commercial activities connected with telecommunications''.
 In the Electricity Act 1989, they are referred to as: 
''commercial activities connected with the generation, transmission or supply of electricity''.
 As we shall see in clause 356, the concurrent powers of Ofcom will be defined as 
''commercial activities connected communications matters.''
 The question is what ''communications matters'' are for that purpose, as the Bill does not say that they are everything relating to communications for which Ofcom has powers. The simplicity of other legislation does not apply in this case. Unless I am much mistaken, the references in subsection (1)(a) to (e) are listed not so much because they must be included—a general definition of communications matters would do that—but because something is to be left out. I notice that newspapers are left out; perhaps other things have been too, but I have not 
 noticed them. We must ask whether that is that the right way to go about things. 
 My submission is that it is right to leave out newspapers. We do not wish Ofcom to have concurrent powers in relation to newspapers, because if it did, it would have to undertake market investigations on newspapers, for example, which it is not best placed to do. It would also have to consider questions of abuse of a dominant position in the newspaper industry, or anti-competitive practices. That would be something that no other sector regulator has sought to do. The Bill does not set up the sector regulatory powers that would be necessary to make Ofcom the best-placed regulator to deal with newspaper issues, so I am content that newspapers should be out of concurrency. 
 Subsections (2) and (3) would change the definition of ''communications matters''. I have tried to establish whether there is comparable power in other legislation for the scope of matters for which other sector regulators have concurrent powers to be amended by order, even if the order is made by the affirmative resolution. I cannot find such a power, but that is probably because the powers defined for other sector regulators are relevant to that sector regulator in the whole of the relevant Act. There is no intention of adding to or subtracting from the general scope of those sector regulators. 
 Why is the order-making power in the Bill? I take it that it is not because the Government attach an order-making power to everything in the Bill in case they want to change it subsequently. It is there for a reason, and that could be one of three reasons. First, the power could be in the Bill to extend the definition of communications matters to matters beyond the Bill. That is highly unlikely. The sector regulator, almost by definition, must regulate only matters for which it has powers, hence making it the best regulator to act. 
 Secondly, the power could be in the Bill to reduce the scope of competition functions if, for example, it were decided that Ofcom should have concurrent powers for telecommunications but not for broadcasting. That is a tenable proposition but it would be undesirable and should be done only through primary legislation and not statutory instrument. We debated competition in relation to broadcasting at great length and we regarded Ofcom as the best-placed regulator for that given all its powers in relation to the industry. The Independent Television Commission has had some, but not all, of the powers that Ofcom will have in relation to broadcasting. 
 Thirdly, the power could be in the Bill in order to extend the definition of communications matters in the Bill. That brings me back to newspapers because the power could be used to bring newspapers into the definition of communications matters. That is undesirable for reasons that I mentioned earlier. 
 I cannot envisage circumstances in which it would be desirable for the definition of communications matters to which concurrency applies to be changed. There is no precedent for a general order-making power on a contingent basis. Amendment No. 677 
 would remove the order-making power. There would be no adverse consequences to other parts of the Bill, but we would define communications matters for subsequent clauses when we applied concurrency.

John Whittingdale: I support the amendment. A large part of the justification for this chapter of the Bill in the explanatory notes relates to the comparison of the powers given to Ofcom in relation to the OFT and those that are available to other utility regulators. According to the notes, the Government intend to set up an arrangement between the OFT and Ofcom that is similar to existing arrangements.
 My hon. Friend the Member for South Cambridgeshire (Mr. Lansley) did not raise a trivial point. There is considerable concern about the way in which Ofcom could expand its remit to inappropriate areas of activity on which it does not have expertise. There is a large worry about potential interference by the Government, and my hon. Friend touched on that. We shall shortly discuss Ofcom's role in newspaper mergers, but this is a sensitive area. The idea that Ofcom's remit could be altered by order of the Secretary of State causes some alarm and there are questions about how that provision might be implemented at a future date. As my hon. Friend said, the measure is largely unprecedented and it is bound to lead to greater concerns; it will also raise questions about why the Government have included the provision at this point. I hope that the Minister will take my hon. Friend's amendment seriously, because it touches on how Ofcom might be used in future, which is causing real fears outside the House. I hope that the Minister will reassure us.

Stephen Timms: Good morning, Mr. Atkinson. I welcome the consensual character of the remarks made by the hon. Member for South Cambridgeshire. Ofcom has an advisory role in relation to newspapers—we will discuss that matter further when we reach the relevant clause later this morning—and there is no intention that the concurrent powers should be extended into that medium. I hope that that assurance helps the Committee.
 The ability to change the list in subsection (1) is included in recognition of the fact that the sector is changing rapidly and expanding fast. The legislative framework must be flexible enough to allow the regulator to deal with the changing products and services supplied by the sector and with the methods by which those are delivered to customers and the general public. We have said much in this Committee about the rapid pace of change in the sector and the provision would provide flexibility in the context of the speed of technological change. That is not an issue in respect of various other fields in which the concurrent powers can be exercised. 
 We must equip ourselves with the ability to respond quickly and effectively to changes that are likely to impact on Ofcom's ability to exercise concurrent powers with the OFT under the Competition Act 
 and the market review provisions of the Enterprise Act 2002. Our aim is that Ofcom should use general competition powers wherever those are most appropriate. The attainment of that aim could be thwarted if technological or market developments leave anomalous gaps in the coverage of Ofcom's powers that could only be filled by new primary legislation. I think that the Committee would agree that that would be an unfortunate outcome. 
 In response to the points that were made by the hon. Member for Maldon and East Chelmsford (Mr. Whittingdale), changes to the definitions can only be made under an order that is approved by affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parliament—subsections (2) and (3) make that clear. It would not just be a matter for the Secretary of State. There would be an opportunity for scrutiny and debate by both Houses, should the need arise.

Andrew Lansley: I am grateful to the Minister. Heaven knows, we are all in favour of future-proofing the Bill. We can see that there is a specific way in which an order could be introduced to extend the definition in a way that we do not want, but there is no specific way in which an order could be used to extend it in a way that we do. Will the Minister give us a specific example of how the definition could change, in respect of technology, so that it does not encompass all communications matters?

Stephen Timms: No. I would not want to speculate about the specific ways in which the provision might be used. As one always says in such discussions, if we could envisage what the circumstances would be, we would have included them in the list in subsection (1). It is precisely because we do not know what the technology or the market developments will bring that we need the flexibility that subsections (2) and (3) provide. There is a requirement for an affirmative resolution by both Houses. Members of the Committee will recognise that that gives an effective safeguard against the concerns of the hon. Member for South Cambridgeshire. I have of course made explicit the fact that we have no intention of extending it to cover newspapers.

John Whittingdale: Obviously, it is convenient for Governments to include a provision in every Bill saying, ''We cannot envisage any circumstances in which we may want to change a piece of legislation, but we are not omnipotent and they may suddenly arise, so it would then be convenient to push through any changes by order.'' While the Minister is right to say that an order requires parliamentary scrutiny, those of us with experience of the scrutiny of orders are aware that that is a fairly limited process. It does not enable amendment. The scrutiny lasts, if we are lucky, for an hour and a half and at the end of it the Government Back Benchers wake up and stop signing their letters and say, ''Aye'', and that is the end of the matter. It does not inspire confidence that the proper protections and safeguards are maintained.

Peter Atkinson: Order. The hon. Gentleman is making a speech, not an intervention.

John Whittingdale: I am sorry, Mr. Atkinson, I am getting carried away. The Minister has not come up
 with any advantages under the subsection, but we have identified some disadvantages. If he felt it to be so necessary, perhaps we could return to the matter as primary legislation in the extreme event that it may or may not lead to change, rather than keep it in the Bill.

Stephen Timms: I am a little surprised by the tone of the hon. Gentleman's remarks, because I can recall numerous lengthy debates in Committees, when Opposition Members were extremely anxious to include in the Bill a requirement for an affirmative resolution in respect of a matter. The hon. Gentleman may belittle that as something of no significance, but neither he nor the hon. Member for South Cambridgeshire would make that point in other circumstances. I think that their normal line on that is right, in that the requirement for an affirmative resolution is a significant and substantial constraint on what the Government can do in future. It is a great reassurance to hon. Members in a wide range of circumstances and they should take a good deal of comfort from it in these circumstances, too.
 The fact is that we do not know where the technology or the market will go in the future. All of us recognise that there are dramatic changes under way and I do not believe that the hon. Gentleman would suggest that they are about to stop. All of us recognise that they will continue and that is why we need the flexibility, with the significant constraint that no change could be made without an affirmative order of both Houses.

Andrew Lansley: I can hear the clatter of the ''Criminal Justice (Lock up anybody you want whenever you want to) Bill'', which is probably proceeding further along the Committee Corridor, even as we speak. After the consensual nature of my introduction to the amendment, the last thing that we will do is to disrupt those proceedings at such an early an hour, so we will not press the matter to a Division.
 I wondered whether ''electronic'' would ever be technologically insufficient for the purpose of the Bill. If it were not a sufficient description of the communications networks and services, we would need not only an order under clause 356 to extend Ofcom's powers and to provide concurrency, but a whole raft of measures. That is one of the principal objections to an order. We cannot just extend Ofcom's powers by finding some small technological loophole. If there is a loophole, it will occur in various places throughout the Bill and the chances are that substantial changes will be needed, rather than a single order under clause 356 to extend concurrency. The Government should think about such matters long and hard—and I have no doubt they have done so. Therefore, I will not press this amendment to a Division now. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

John Whittingdale: I seek clarification about a small matter that touches on an area that we have already
 addressed—the wide range of activities that could come within the scope of Ofcom's competition functions.
 I am particularly concerned about subsection (1)(d), which refers to 
''apparatus used for providing or making available anything mentioned in the preceding paragraphs''.
 The word ''apparatus'' can be defined quite widely. It could refer to equipment that might be maintained in telephone exchanges or broadcasting equipment. I am still not wholly convinced that Ofcom should have the right to scrutinise those items under its competition powers, but ''apparatus'' could be interpreted more broadly, so that it refers to televisions or radio receivers. 
 That might not be the Minister's intention, and he may be satisfied that ''apparatus'' is incapable of being interpreted in that way, but I seek his assurance on that. If we were to draw a comparison between the activities of Ofcom and those of Ofwat or Ofgem, for example, there is a possible interpretation that would mean that Ofwat might have some remit to scrutinise competition in the market for bath taps, or that Ofgem might be able to examine the hairdryer market. Ofcom should not get involved in the sale of apparatus that is used for communication services through telephones and so forth.

Andrew Lansley: The Government have told the Committee a little about television receivers, and monitors used for computing purposes and television receivers, and the answer to, ''Is it a television receiver?'' is, ''Does it receive television?'' When a monitor—or, sometimes, even a television—is purchased, it is not necessarily clear for what purpose it will be used. I presume that television sets that might be used for receiving broadcasting might be treated as apparatus for electronic network purposes.

John Whittingdale: My hon. Friend raises an interesting point. It is a matter of some sadness to me that the clauses relating to the licence fee passed by without our having the opportunity to debate them, because that was a point that I would have liked to have explored.
 I obtained a ministerial answer not so long ago that confirmed that a personal computer that can receive television signals—most new PCs have that capability—is a television receiver in the eyes of the television licensing centre and that therefore it should have a licence; it is debatable whether that is a method by which the television licensing centre is extending its grasp even further. If that argument applies with regard to whether a receiver needs a licence, it could also apply to apparatus related to electronic communication services. My hon. Friend has raised a point that increases my concern about this matter. The idea that Ofcom might be able to investigate competition in the supply of electronic equipment by Dixons, Currys and PC World seems absurd.

Richard Allan: Does the hon. Gentleman accept that there might be some exceptional circumstances? For example, in the mobile phone market, which has had financial difficulties, one can imagine the majority of manufacturers going out
 of business. I certainly can envisage circumstances in which there might be few manufacturers left, and questions would be asked about the competitive nature of the market for the essential equipment needed to access those networks. I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman could envisage such circumstances, too.

John Whittingdale: I have some difficulty with the extent to which Oftel has intervened in the mobile phone market, because I think that that market is quite competitive. However, even in the mobile phone market, the fact that the sale of handsets is linked to the contract for service provision means that there is a reason why the sale of handsets should be examined by the regulator. There is no link between the sale of telephones, televisions or radios and the provision of services, so I do not think that there is any justification for the provisions. There is no concern about the lack of competition in that market, either. I recently purchased a television by means of the internet, and the extent to which competitive forces are now applying downward pressure on prices, particularly through internet marketing, is enormous. There is no need to include the provision.

Andrew Robathan: Surely mobile phones have an international market. Ofcom has very little to do with whether mobile phones or television receivers should be considered apparatus and how they should be marketed. In such an international market, one narrow national regulator should not have such authority.

John Whittingdale: My hon. Friend is right. This is a subject in which the principles of free trade apply. I do not want to spend too much time on the clause, but it raises an issue that we mentioned in debate on the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for South Cambridgeshire—the scope that the Bill seems to give Ofcom and the Government through powers under competition legislation. Those powers are extensive, and we should be careful to ensure that they are properly focused on the right part of the market. We should take care that they cannot be extended, either at the whim of the Secretary of State or because of the fuzzy drafting of the clause, to parts of the market in which there is no particular concern about the state of competition. In particular, the powers should not relate to matters about which Ofcom has no great knowledge, experience or expertise that is not already available from the Office of Fair Trading.

Michael Fabricant: I hate to rise in disagreement—although it is only a slight disagreement—with my hon. Friend, but I would not criticise the drafting of the clause as being fuzzy. The issue is more the fuzzy logic with regard to the provision of electronic equipment, its interface and convergence, which is after all what the Bill is all about.
 Several hon. Members have said that there are huge overlaps between types of electronic equipment. My hon. Friend the Member for Maldon and East Chelmsford, with whom I agree in this respect, has pointed out that a computer can now be used as a 
 television reception device. That poses a question. I know that what I am about to say partly comes under clause 354, but I am relating the issue to clause 355. Every retailer who sells a television must report the name and address of the purchaser to the licensing authorities. Would the same obligation apply in the case of someone who goes into PC World and buys a TV reception card? 
 The House is going through a rather traumatic time, as we are all being told to upgrade our computers to Windows 2000, and Members of Parliament are being supplied with compact computers.

Peter Atkinson: Order. This is a very interesting debate, and I do not want to stop the hon. Gentleman just as he is starting, but I remind him that we are debating competition law. Perhaps he could confine his remarks to that subject.

Michael Fabricant: The question is, would the provision of a TV reception card be within the orbit of clause 355? Will the Minister explain whether Ofcom would be beyond its remit in determining what provision of equipment or services might come under competition law, which would involve interference with the market? I suspect that the Minister will answer that Ofcom will take a sensible approach, but I share the concern of my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon and East Chelmsford. The drafting of clause 355 must be future proof, but because of the drafting, were Ofcom not an enlightened organisation, it might go beyond the remit originally anticipated by the Minister. For example, subsection (1)(a) refers to
''the provision of electronic communications networks'',
 which could include cable television. 
 One could go into PC World and buy a network card—a PCM1A card is available, to return to the compact computers that have been issued to all Members of Parliament. If we were to buy a network card and install it in our computers at home, would that be within the orbit of clause 355(1)(a)? It is highly unlikely but not impossible. Perhaps my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon and East Chelmsford was right and I was wrong to disagree that the drafting of the clause was fuzzy.

Mark Hoban: The provision of cards may not fall within paragraph (a), but it may fall within paragraph (d), which refers to
''apparatus used for providing or making available anything mentioned in the preceding paragraphs''.

Michael Fabricant: My hon. Friend has hit the nail on the head. He has shown that absolutely nothing that could be connected to a network or used for any form of communication is precluded from clause 355.
 The issue is an interesting one to explore. If one is on the internet, one is very much part of a communications network. I challenge the Minister with a different question: instead of asking whether Ofcom might go beyond its brief, what areas of communication would not fall under clause 355?

Chris Bryant: This speech.

Michael Fabricant: What possible area of network communications could not come under clause 355 and be specifically excluded? There is a real risk that a less
 enlightened board of Ofcom would go beyond the remit of the Bill. Several hon. Members have said that we will be back in Committee in three or four years with another Broadcasting or Communications Bill. God forbid!

Chris Bryant: Take it easy.

Michael Fabricant: The hon. Gentleman seeks to intervene and delay me in my effort to tease certain answers from the Minister. Permit me to continue my teasing without interruption. I seek your protection, Mr. Atkinson—[Hon. Members: ''Ah!'']. What areas specifically relating to network communication do not come under the orbit of competition law referred to in clause 355? Although I appreciate that this is an attempt to future-proof the legislation, so that we shall not find ourselves in four of five years' time back here in Committee Room 10 under your enlightened chairmanship, Mr. Atkinson—

Peter Atkinson: I will not make the same mistake twice.

Michael Fabricant: The Chairman says that he will not make the same mistake twice. However, I suspect that he is enjoying this interesting debate. I would like to find out which areas will be excluded. Does the Minister not think that, by future-proofing the legislation, he has made the locus of clause 355 too broad? How can he ensure that future generations within Ofcom will listen to what he has said, rather than adhering precisely to the provisions of the clause, which show no bounds?

Andrew Robathan: I support my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon and East Chelmsford. We have had a particularly entertaining discussion thanks, particularly, to my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield (Michael Fabricant) talking in his inimitable way about the broad locus of the Bill. Nevertheless the clause is important, because it covers matters in relation to which Ofcom should have competition functions. If one were standing back, one might assume that that was the limit of Ofcom's power, and what it should consider. However, as both of my hon. Friends have pointed out, there seem to be no limits. If we talk about apparatus, we are not sure what it is. We have debated the matter before, and I do not want to revisit old debates, but there is still no clarity—[Interruption.] Hon. Members say that it was two months ago. We were not sitting then, but that is nearly the case. I hope that we shall not be sitting in two months' time, God willing. We still have no clarity about what will be covered by, for instance, apparatus. There has been a suggestion that Ofcom might need to rule on mobile telephones, but I do not think that that is the case. It is an international market; Nokia is marketing telephones in Japan. We need to consider how to get our Government out of involvement in such matters rather than involving a Government agency—in this case, Ofcom—in matters that are best left to the market. I hope that the Minister will finally clarify the limits of Ofcom's powers relating to apparatus and other matters defined in the Bill. The Bill should be about limiting powers, not about broadening them.

Stephen Timms: The hon. Member for Lichfield made a promising start by disagreeing with his hon. Friend, but he lost his way subsequently.
 Together with clauses 356 and 357, the clause gives Ofcom concurrent powers with those of the OFT under general competition law in respect of communications matters, including broadcasting and related matters, but not for mergers. The scope of the items listed in subsection (1) needs to be understood clearly in that context. As its title indicates, the clause is about matters in relation to which Ofcom has competition functions alongside the OFT. The clause sets out the range of matters in respect of which it has that concurrency in the full range of powers to deal with cases under the Competition Act and the market investigation provisions of the Enterprise Act. 
 Hon. Members have asked me to spell out the breadth of the application of the clause. At present, the situation is anomalous. The Director General of Telecommunications has concurrency with the OFT with regard to telecommunications and related matters and the arrangements work well. However, for historical reasons, the ITC and the Radio Authority do not have similar concurrent powers in respect of broadcasting matters. At the moment, the relevant powers are exercised by the OFT alone, and the clause will ensure that Ofcom has such powers, and not only in respect of telecommunications.

Andrew Robathan: On that point, it is all very well for the Minister to say that he is making the provisions the same and more logical, but he has not said whether it is desirable for Ofcom to have such powers.

Stephen Timms: It is highly desirable. It would make no sense to create Ofcom as the independent regulator for the whole communications sector, but not to give it powers to deal with competition issues that arise in that sector under general competition law and the sector-specific regime. That would be particularly illogical given that we want Ofcom to use the Competition Act in preference to sectoral powers wherever that would be a more appropriate way of proceeding. The clause will allow it do that.
 As regards the reference to apparatus, we have been round that particular course several times in our debates. We are including provisions to allow Ofcom to apply sectoral competition rules to the supply of communications apparatus in certain circumstances. We have had several interesting discussions about the number of people who still rent their telephones from the incumbent telephony operator, and we have indeed established that the hon. Member for Ryedale (Mr. Greenway) is one such person. We also referred to the fact that many such telephones are still hard wired, which is why we need to keep the ability to address the issue in the Bill. I refer hon. Members back to clause 89, on which we had the major debate on the subject.

Mark Hoban: The Minister pointed out that we have had several debates about hard wires and rented apparatus, and I wonder whether the cost of giving everyone a free telephone—

Peter Atkinson: Order. That is nothing to do with the clause.

Stephen Timms: We have debated the matter extensively, and I simply remind the Committee of what I said—I think that it was in response to the hon. Member for Lichfield. We will look at the definition of apparatus to ensure that there are no difficulties and we will return to the subject on Report if necessary.

Michael Fabricant: The whole thrust of my point may have been hidden by the other issues that I was discussing. I was asking whether any areas of networking would not be covered by the clause.

Stephen Timms: No. The communications sector, as defined in the clause, is covered. We want Ofcom to be able to exercise concurrent powers with the Director General of Fair Trading in the whole communications sector, as defined in the clause. We do not want to exclude any part of the electronic communications market. Given that assurance, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will feel that the clause is a welcome addition to the Bill.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 355 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 356 - OFCOM's functions under Part 4 of the Enterprise Act 2002

Andrew Lansley: I beg to move amendment No. 675, in
clause 356, page 307, line 20, after '(b)', insert 
 'in any other provision of that Act,'.

Peter Atkinson: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 676, in
clause 357, page 308, line 40, after '(b)', insert 
 'in any other provision of that Act,'.

Andrew Lansley: As the Minister briefly informed us, clause 356 is about the extension of concurrent powers to Ofcom under the Enterprise Act. At the moment, concurrency does not apply to the ITC, but it does apply to Oftel. In the clause, we are broadening the concurrency that Ofcom enjoys compared with Oftel.
 There are two groups of amendments to the clause, and the second is the more substantive. In the manner of my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield, I shall therefore narrow my locus for a moment and talk about a specific drafting point. I freely confess that I may simply not understand why the language is as it is, and I should be grateful if the Minister would enlighten me. 
 The provision in clause 356(3) is mirrored in part 2 of schedule 9 on page 248 of the Enterprise Act in relation to the Director General of Telecommunications, although the language is different from that in clause 356. Why is it different? Amendment No. 675 relates to the Enterprise Act 2002 and amendment No. 676 relates to the Competition Act 1998. Paragraph 2(6) in part 2 of schedule 10 of the Competition Act contains language that I assume is intended to be mirrored in clause 357(3). The two amendments deal with the same issue but in relation to two different statutes. 
 Why is the wording different? I may be wrong, but let me say what I think. The approach seems to be that if, in relation to part 4 of the Enterprise Act, one 
 requires references to the OFT to be construed as including references to Ofcom, it may be assumed unnecessary to make any similar assumption about any other part of the Act. Almost by definition, one need not specify where the context requires that outside part 4 because, outside part 4, references to the OFT will not be construed as references to Ofcom and will be construed as references to Ofcom or to a sector regulator only where the original Act—the Enterprise Act or Competition Act—requires them to be so construed. 
 Now let me say why that is not sufficient. Of course, part 4 of the Enterprise Act or, in respect of clause 357, part 1 of the Competition Act are not the only provisions describing powers in the hands of the OFT and the sector regulators, which need to be used concurrently. There are other powers. For example, section 203 of the Enterprise Act relates to powers of entry. As far as I am aware, it is intended that, under the Enterprise Act, powers of entry should be used concurrently by sector regulators and the OFT. If powers are held concurrently, they are not in part 4 but in part 7. In so far as they relate to part 4, it might be held that, by implication, references to the OFT should be construed also as references to Ofcom, but not necessarily so. It seems to me that we should be prepared for the read-across to go outside the relevant part of the legislation. 
 That brings us back to the language of the Enterprise Act, which is different. It says, 
''references . . . shall be construed as including references to Ofcom except—
in sections 166 and 171;''—
 we need not detain ourselves with what that means— 
''and
(b) where the context otherwise requires.''
 But in the absence of the amendment, 
''where the context otherwise requires''
 would relate only to part 4. However, it should relate also to other parts of the Bill. The same is true, for instance, in relation to section 204 of the Enterprise Act on the disqualification of directors, which is a concurrent power. I paid slightly less attention to that part of the Enterprise Act when I was a member of the Committee that considered that legislation than I did to this part of the Communications Bill. Perhaps I missed it. 
 It seems that investigation powers under sections 62 and 64 of the Competition Act can be used concurrently, and that should be done in a similar fashion to that in which we relate concurrency to Ofcom. My question is, in a nutshell, whether the drafting of the Enterprise Act and the Competition Act is wrong—perhaps that is a bit harsh on the draftsmen; I should have said unnecessary. Is it unnecessarily wide, and is the drafting used in the Bill right—narrow, but necessarily or correctly narrow—or have we inadvertently in clauses 356 and 357 narrowed our focus—or narrowed our locus, as my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield might say—onto part 4 of the Enterprise Act and part 1 of the 
 Competition Act, leaving out other parts of those Acts that ought to have been included?

Stephen Timms: I think that I can give the hon. Gentleman the reassurance that he seeks. The provisions of subsection (3) are confined to part 4 of the Enterprise Act 2002. In other words, the wording of the subsection can be used to extend concurrent powers to Ofcom only insofar as those powers are referred to in part 4 of the Enterprise Act. Even without the amendment, subsection (3) cannot be used to extend powers from part 7 of the Enterprise Act. That raises a rather different question, however, about the powers in part 7 of the Enterprise Act mentioned by the hon. Gentleman that ought to be applied to Ofcom.
 In the context of this debate, the point is that subsection (3) does not convey those powers to Ofcom. However, there are investigation powers in part 4 and in section 174, and other powers appear in part 3—for example, requirements about the attendance of witnesses are applied by section 176. On reflection, the hon. Gentleman should accept that adding the words proposed in the amendment would not change the meaning, because that meaning can be used only to give Ofcom powers that are in part 4 of the Enterprise Act—or, in the case of clause 357, in part 1 of the Competition Act. The other powers to which he referred, which may well be needed, are applied elsewhere in the Bill.

Andrew Lansley: First, I want to be sure that Ofcom requires no power as a concurrent regulator in relation to those two Acts that is reflected in other parts of the legislation but that is not applied by virtue of part 4 of the Enterprise Act and part 1 of the Competition Act.
 Secondly, is the drafting of the Enterprise Act, in so far as it is the same as the Competition Act for those purposes, wider than is needed? Therefore, the drafting is different for the Communications Bill. I want to be absolutely sure that the Minister is clear that the drafting is different and does not need to be the same as it was for the other pieces of legislation, including the Enterprise Act, which was drafted only last year.

Stephen Timms: I am not entirely clear about the hon. Gentleman's second question. I would need to look at the precise drafting of the Enterprise Act, but I am confident that it is correct. I am equally confident that the job that must be done is done by the wording in the Bill.
 Turning to the hon. Gentleman's first question, the answer is yes. We need Ofcom to be able to have certain powers, and those powers are contained elsewhere in the Bill. Clause 356(3) is restricted to the powers in part 4 of the Enterprise Act. Any other powers that are needed are set out elsewhere.

Andrew Lansley: I am grateful to the Minister, and I take his point. I did not understand that when he first made his point about powers elsewhere that he was referring to clauses 174 and 176 in this Bill, not the Enterprise Act. On that basis, and especially because the Minister said that the Government would be sure about the disparity in drafting, I am content to leave the matter to further consideration.
 I am not attempting to make a point about drafting, Mr. Atkinson. Drafting is intensely difficult. Even the drafting of legislation such as the Enterprise Act is capable of improvement—everything is capable of improvement. It may be that the Bill works better as a formulation than the Enterprise Act did last year. Unless the Minister wishes to intervene, I shall be happy to seek leave to withdraw the amendment.

Stephen Timms: I need to clarify that my references were to sections 174 and 176 of the Enterprise Act, and not to the Communications Bill.

Andrew Lansley: Clearly, Mr. Atkinson, my research for amendments Nos. 675 and 676 took me only so far. Although, in iteration in Committee, one can read, think and look at the same time, I, too, shall look at sections 174 and 176 to see whether they do the job. However, I am content that it is perfectly obvious that a train of thought has been followed that has been designed to ensure that everything is grouped back in by application under part 4 of the Enterprise Act, and that the required powers are there. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Andrew Lansley: I beg to move amendment No.678, in
clause 356, page 307, line 29, at end insert 
 'and they shall together agree who shall exercise functions in relation to that matter.'.

Peter Atkinson: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No.679, in
clause 356, page 308, line 21, at end add— 
 '(13) The Secretary of State may make regulations for the purpose of coordinating the performance of functions under Part 4 of the Enterprise Act 2002 which are exercisable concurrently by the Office of Fair Trading and OFCOM by virtue of this section.'.

Andrew Lansley: This might be a little simpler, amazingly. The amendments probably cut to the purpose of the clause in more accessible ways for those who read our debates.
 Concurrency regulations under the Competition Act were made in 2000, and I do not think that subsequent regulations have been made. Disappointingly, much as we value the presence of the Minister from the Department of Trade and Industry, it was the Minister for Tourism, Film and Broadcasting, who, as the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Consumer and Corporate Affairs, signed the regulations. I was looking forward to teasing him about his recollection of his own regulations: I suspect that he would know them pretty well. 
 The concurrency regulations are important from the point of view of industry's understanding of the matter, and of reassuring it that it will not suffer double jeopardy. When the Joint Committee began its work, the risk of double jeopardy was one of the concerns that were raised about the nature of Ofcom with regard to the Communications Bill. Double jeopardy can occur only if the concurrent powers are used in ways that are duplicatory, and if they are improperly co-ordinated between the two regulators. It was the view of the Joint Committee—and my personal view—that the concerns that were raised 
 could not be substantiated by evidence: examples from other sectors give no reason to suppose that it is impossible for concurrency to be pursued in a way that does not give rise to double jeopardy. Indeed, it should enable competition powers to be used more effectively. As the Minister rightly said, in so far as sector powers are being used as well, it offers a route by which ex ante powers and sector specific powers can progressively be dispensed with in favour of competition based powers, which—in the longer term—industry will find are more congenial to the maintenance of a market structure. Therefore, I have no difficulty with the intentions of clause 356. 
 There is a difference between clause 356, which deals with the Enterprise Act, and clause 357, which addresses the Communications Act. When we come to look at concurrency in relation to the Competition Act, we will find that there is already a power in that Act for the making of regulations: regulations have been made, and we can see the process by which concurrency works. With regard to the Enterprise Act, there is no comparable power that requires or permits the making of regulations for how concurrency works. 
 It might be the case that, by implication, concurrency works in relation to the Enterprise Act in similar ways to how it works under the Competition Act. Indeed, when one looks through clause 356, that seems to be what is going on. The manner in which concurrency should be exercised between the OFT and Ofcom is specified in clause 356, even though it is not specified in the Enterprise Act: for example, there is a requirement to consult in subsection (5). The requirement in subsection (6) that if one of those bodies were to act the other should not, specifically excludes the double jeopardy point. 
 The strongest principle in the regulations, and the one on which Ministers should rely when they introduce legislation on concurrency, is that the best placed regulator acts. That is enshrined in the guidance on concurrency that accompanies the Competition Act. Paragraph 3.8 states: 
''The general principle will be that a case will be dealt with by whichever of the Director General of Fair Trading or the relevant regulator is better, or best, placed to do so.''
 However, there is a problem with how that might work, because the first regulator to act is not necessarily the best placed one. The guidance issued under the Competition Act contemplates that one regulator might initiate proceedings but conclude after consultation that the other regulator is best placed to act and there is power to transfer a case from one regulator to another, but nothing in clause 356 contemplates the possibility of such a transfer. 
 Paragraph 3.10 of the guidance issued under the Competition Act states: 
''Once the matter has been determined under Regulations 5 or 6, Regulation 7 also prohibits any other authority from exercising prescribed functions in relation to that case''—
 so regulation 7 in the statutory instrument is a parallel to subsection (6)— 
''unless it is formally transferred to that authority under the procedures laid down in Regulation 8.''
 Although the principle that if one regulator starts, the other should not exercise functions is established in the regulations under the 1998 Act, those regulations allow for the subsequent transfer of cases. Unless I misunderstand the legislation, the provisions exclude the possibility of a transfer of a case between two regulators. 
 Is there an omission? That is the point that I was coming to on the amendments. Amendment No. 679 would permit the Secretary of State to 
''make regulations for the purpose of coordinating the performance of functions''.
 The transfer of functions is merely one example of the way in which regulations could be made for that purpose. 
 Amendment No. 678 would add to subsection (5). Whereas the OFT and Ofcom have to consult each other before exercising functions, the purpose of the amendment is to make sure that neither regulator engages—I hope that this will never happen—in a pre-emptive strike on the other. They would be required to agree. One could not merely consult the other and then act. If they did not agree, under subsection (8) they would be required to go to the Secretary of State for a determination as to how the matter should be dealt with. It seems to me that those two bodies should not only consult, but agree. That is implied by the structure of the clause. 
 Amendment No. 678 is consistent with the intention of subsection (5) and closes off what might otherwise be a risk of something that I hope would not occur. On amendment No. 679, in so far as there might be issues dealt with in the regulations under the Competition Act that appear not to be properly dealt with under either the Enterprise Act or the clause, regulations could be made, for example, on the transfer of functions.

Stephen Timms: I agree that the exercise by the OFT and Ofcom of their concurrent powers under part 4 of the Enterprise Act needs to operate smoothly, fairly and effectively. That has been the case with the OFT and sectoral regulators under the Competition Act, but the amendments would introduce some unnecessary additional provisions into the arrangement, and I therefore hope that hon. Members agree that they are not appropriate.
 Amendment No. 678 would require the OFT and Ofcom not merely to consult each other before deciding which of them should take a case under the 2002 Act, but to agree which of them should take that case, as the hon. Member for South Cambridgeshire has explained. That is indeed the position under the concurrency regulations that my hon. Friend the Minister for Tourism, Film and Broadcasting issued in relation to the Competition Act. It is certainly right that we need to prevent double jeopardy and duplication of action by the concurrent regulators. However, I hope that the hon. Gentleman would agree that substantively the same practical effect is achieved under the Bill in subsection (6), which provides that 
''Neither the Office of Fair Trading nor OFCOM shall exercise . . . functions which are exercisable concurrently . . . if functions 
which are so exercisable have been exercised in relation to that matter by the other.''

Andrew Lansley: If the problem were double jeopardy, that would be fine. However, as I have explained, the problem is that in those circumstances, which I freely acknowledge have not to my knowledge arisen, whereby one regulator—say, Ofcom if it had a less enlightened board—decided to engage in a market investigation but was not best placed to act, there would be nothing in the provisions to stop Ofcom pursuing that route after consultation with the OFT and simply using subsection (6) to be the first to act, thereby closing off the possibility of action by the OFT.

Stephen Timms: To conclude the point that I was making about the difference between the arrangements under the Competition Act and the Enterprise Act, the formulation is somewhat different in each, but the effect is the same.
 The hon. Gentleman is, I think, raising a point about the possibility of transfers. He was arguing earlier that in some circumstances it should be possible to bring about a transfer between the two. Transfers can be handled by administrative arrangements between the regulators, as happens in relation to the Enterprise Act. These things work by way of a co-ordination arrangement, through the concurrency working party, a group of officials from the OFT and the sectoral regulators set up when the Competition Act was introduced. That has worked well.

Andrew Lansley: But that is precisely where the difference between the Competition Act, the Enterprise Act and the current proposal is relevant. Under the Competition Act, regulation 8 allows for transfers. Subsection (6), however, implies that once either Ofcom or the OFT had begun to act, transfers would not be possible. In fact, they are expressly excluded in primary legislation. That is not how the Competition Act works. There is nothing in it to preclude or allow transfers. The matter is dealt with in secondary legislation. Under the Bill, primary legislation will block transfers.

Stephen Timms: No, because administrative arrangements between the regulators will still be possible, as is the case under the Enterprise Act.
 Amendment No. 679 would replicate for the Enterprise Act the powers in the Competition Act for the Secretary of State to make concurrency regulations. We have not made provision for that in the Bill, because, first, the clause as it stands deals with the possibility of double jeopardy, as I have said. Secondly, whereas the regulations made under the Competition Act contain various detailed provisions about the way in which these matters will be handled—for example, with regard to telling those concerned which of the concurrent bodies is dealing with their case—we do not consider that necessary for the Enterprise Act. 
 That is partly because the Enterprise Act already provides—for example at section 169—a process in which those with an interest in a part 4 investigation must be consulted before any reference is made to the 
 Competition Commission. Thus, interested parties will know before any substantive decisions are taken as to who is in charge of the case. Another reason is that—in contrast to the situation under the Competition Act, when concurrency was a relatively new concept and more sectoral regulators were involved—the Bill deals with concurrency as an established concept in one sector, and we have created Ofcom as the independent regulator for that sector. All that needs to be done is for Ofcom to work out the detail of the processes that it will adopt in the relevant context, in conjunction with the OFT. 
 In fact, the OFT is already in the process of preparing more detailed guidelines on the operation of the Enterprise Act, in co-operation with the other sector regulators with concurrent powers, including the bodies whose activities will be subsumed into Ofcom. There is thus already good co-ordination on the matters in question, and I look forward to its continuing. The powers in clause 356 are drafted to fit with the powers in the Enterprise Act and they mirror those for other regulated sectors. The hon. Gentleman is right to note that the approach is slightly different from that in the Competition Act, but I hope that I have persuaded him that sufficient procedural safeguards are built into the provisions as drafted. 
 Both the amendments are unnecessary, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will feel able to withdraw them.

Andrew Lansley: I am afraid that on this occasion the Minister has not persuaded me at all. Indeed, he tried at one point to have things both ways. He argued that there was no need for amendments like mine because the best placed regulator would act in the first instance, under the Enterprise Act, and because there is a duty to consult under section 169 of that Act, and so on—by extension, he argued that it would always be true that the first regulator to act would be the best place to act; he argued also that, in any case, administratively, the two regulators could transfer functions between them if, in any circumstance, one were to act but the other was best placed. He cannot have it both ways. I may be wrong, but it seems to me, on the face of it, that the second argument is certainly not true. I cannot see how administrative arrangements between the regulators—still less if those arrangements were not covered by secondary legislation—could override what appears to be a requirement under clause 356(6).
 I am even slightly worried about whether, if Ofcom were to begin the process of consultation on a market investigation, it would be construed as exercising 
''in relation to any matter functions which are exercisable concurrently''.
 Once Ofcom starts the process—even the process of consulting about a market investigation—will it, by virtue of subsection (6), be required to continue, even if the scope of the market investigation would make it better for the Office of Fair Trading to act? 
 This is not a purely academic and theoretical argument. Many people in the industry feel that over time there will be merit in market investigations being conducted by the OFT, even when it might be possible 
 for Ofcom to conduct them, because of the benefit of having them carried out by a more independent body than Ofcom. As time goes on, in relation to some of the issues, Ofcom has become intimately connected to the market structure that has been created by virtue of licence conditions relating to broadcasting and significant market power conditions that have been set under telecommunications legislation. 
 I am not content that the structure of the Bill properly provides yet for the degree of flexibility that should be available under the Enterprise Act. The issue is not about double jeopardy. I am pretty sure that in more or less any circumstances the regulators will avoid that. It is about the achievement of the general principle that the best-placed regulator should be the one to act. It is also about establishing the flexibility that would enable that to happen. The important points are, first, that the two regulators should not only consult one another, but be required to agree, and, secondly, that they should have the ability to transfer cases if it becomes apparent, even after the commencement of functions, that a regulator—probably Ofcom—should transfer to the OFT. 
 I shall not press the amendment to a vote because I have made my point and I have no doubt that the Government's intentions are the same as mine. There is no difference over policy—only over drafting—and the last thing that I should claim would be the ability to draft legislation. My amendments might not be right. However, the Government need to think hard about the matter. If they agree with me, there may be room for more amendment to clause 356. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

John Whittingdale: I want to raise a specific matter about the clause and then to make a more general observation about what the clause is intended to achieve.
 The first matter amounts to a suggested change. I apologise to the Committee, because had I thought about it earlier I should have tabled it as an amendment. As I did not do so, perhaps I may at least draw it to the Minister's attention. Much of our debate on the clause has been about trying to reproduce the powers and the terms set out in the Enterprise Act, as well as the general application of competition law. 
 My particular concern is about the wording of the Bill, which is different from that in other legislation in cases where it would be sensible and consistent to use the same wording. I am looking particularly at subsection (7)(a), which imposes the duty on Ofcom, for the purpose of assisting the Competition Commission in carrying out an investigation, to give the commission 
''any information which . . . relates to matters falling within the scope of the investigation,''
 and, under subsection (7)(b), 
''any other assistance which the Commission may require''.
 It might be more sensible to insert the word ''reasonably'' in relation to both information and assistance, so it would read ''which reasonably relates'' and ''may reasonably require''. If we were to do that, it would put the measure on a par with the requirements on the OFT in part 4 of the Enterprise Act. In the corresponding provision of that Act, the OFT must act reasonably in relation to providing information to the Competition Commission once it has referred the matter to it for investigation, and it may give such assistance as the Commission may reasonably require. Such an amendment, had I had time to table it, would have phrased the Bill so that it mirrored the Enterprise Act. I apologise to the Minister that it is not an amendment, but I put it to him for consideration. 
 While he is reflecting on that, might I make a more general observation in relation to the clause. We are dealing with the functions carried out by Ofcom under the terms of the Enterprise Act. I was fortunate enough to debate that Act on Second Reading. In general, I support it. My hon. Friend the Member for South Cambridgeshire and I are graduates of the Tebbit school. When Lord Tebbit was Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, he laid down the principle that references to the competition authorities for intervention should be made only on competition grounds. Subsequent Secretaries of State have followed that rule, with varying degrees of rigour. Some notable exceptions occurred in the early life of this Government, when references were made that seemed to have little to do with competition. The clause concerns competition and the Enterprise Act essentially puts that in statute and removes ministerial interference. 
 In the next section we shall debate the specific exemption to that principle, which relates to newspaper mergers. However, before we do so, I should like to say something about the way in which the Enterprise Act is framed. I expressed a concern during debates on the Act that applies equally to this clause, which deals with Ofcom's carrying out its functions under the Enterprise Act in terms of the communications market. 
 I believe in the power of the market and competition, as do my hon. Friends. It has been argued that we do not need to have competition references; if there is abuse of market power, or a cartel is in operation, somebody will enter the market or somebody else will undercut, and in the long term there will be a market-based solution. However, I am persuaded that the market does not always act quickly or effectively enough. I commend to the Committee the work of Dr. Irwin Stelzer, who has written persuasively on the matter. He is a fine advocate of the free market and of competition policy. If he believes that it is necessary for Government to intervene to prevent abuse, who am I to question him? I have concerns about paragraph 723 of the explanatory notes to clause 356, which states: 
''Part 4 of the Enterprise Act 2002 will replace the monopoly provisions of the Fair Trading Act 1973 with a new regime of 'marketing investigations'.''
 It goes on to say that market investigations might be necessary 
''where competition does not appear to be working well, but where there is no apparent breach of existing competition law.''
 It then says: 
''An example of the sort of circumstances in which a market investigation might take place would be a situation where a few large firms supplied almost the whole of the market and, without there being any agreement between them, they all tended to follow parallel courses of conduct, while new competitors faced significant barriers to entry''
 I expressed some concerns at the time of the Enterprise Act because, essentially, it boils down to Ministers thinking that there may be something dodgy going on but not having evidence to back up their suspicions. That has led inevitably to the imposition of huge costs on the industries that have been subjected to investigations. I would like to give a couple of examples because they illustrate the dangers. 
 The first, although it is not directly the responsibility of Ofcom it is related, is the record industry. There have been stories of the rigging of markets and the pricing of compact disks in particular over many, many years. In 1993, a year-long investigation by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission—

Peter Atkinson: Order. I would be grateful to the hon. Gentleman if he told me what his argument has to do with the very precise provisions of clause 356, which deal with the functions of Ofcom under part 4 of the Enterprise Act. I know that he is going on a wide preamble; nevertheless, I wish that he would return to the subject matter as soon as possible.

John Whittingdale: My argument is relevant because clause 356 deals with that part of the communications market in which Ofcom applies Enterprise Act powers. Therefore my concerns about how such powers can be used apply equally to Ofcom in looking at the communications market as they do to how the Office of Fair Trading can use its new powers under the Enterprise Act. It is perfectly relevant to consider examples in which Enterprise Act powers have been used because the dangers that arise from them are equally applicable to how Ofcom might interpret its powers under clause 356.
 It is valuable to consider a few examples. The example of the record industry is a very good one because it was subject to a full investigation by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, which cleared the industry of any wrongdoing.

Michael Fabricant: Is my hon. Friend aware that the old Select Committee on National Heritage also conducted an inquiry and confirmed that there was a monopoly in the record industry?

Peter Atkinson: Order. Once again, we are debating examples. I have told the hon. Member for Maldon and East Chelmsford that his remarks were going wide of the clause and I hoped that he was bringing his them to a conclusion. I would be grateful if he did not engage in the debate suggested by the hon. Member for Lichfield.

John Whittingdale: I merely suggest to my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield, with due respect to
 the Committee, that if I had to say which was more likely to find the truth, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission or the Department of Culture, Media and Sport, I know which of them I would choose. The important point is that the record industry was subjected to a year-long investigation that found no evidence of wrongdoing. That investigation cost the industry about £20 million.
 Nevertheless, in the past three years there have been five more investigations, none of which has overturned the conclusions of the first one. There is a danger that the general view will be that, although they found nothing this time, something is clearly going on because prices are very high and considerable profits are being made, so we should have another look at it. The same thing happened in the 1990s, when the former Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, the right hon. Member for Tyneside, North (Mr. Byers), stood up at a Labour party conference and started talking about rip-off Britain. That led to an investigation into supermarket pricing, which did not come up with any evidence. 
 Although I am all in favour of giving powers to a regulator to root out anti-competitive practice and to search for evidence of cartels, we should always remember that that is not a cost-free option. It places a significant burden on the industry, which is subject to investigation at a considerable cost. It is incumbent on the regulator to think very carefully before recommending a full investigation. Some have argued that, when an industry is subject to an investigation and incurs considerable costs in providing the regulator with material concerning its market position, if the subsequent inquiry finds that it has acted properly and that there is no evidence of anti-competitive practice, the industry might have some claim for costs. I raised that suggestion during debate on the Enterprise Bill and it did not find favour. However, we should bear it in mind. 
 Ofcom should examine areas where there have been allegations of abuse of market power, particularly the area of conditional access charges, because there is a dominant position. In some cases, such allegations turn out to be justified, in others they do not. Nevertheless, there should not be a rolling examination—as soon as one investigation into potential abuse has finished the next one starts. At this stage of the Bill—when we are considering how Ofcom is to carry out its functions under the Enterprise Act—we should flag up a warning. We cannot assume that having investigations into potential anti-competitive practices will always be of benefit to the consumer, especially if no evidence is found and a large price tag is attached. The consequence will be that the consumer will have to pick up the bill.

Stephen Timms: The hon. Member for Maldon and East Chelmsford has raised two points. First, he wants to add the word ''reasonably'' in two places in clause 356. He will know from our discussions that Ofcom has always to act reasonably. We are resistant to the idea of putting in the Bill statements to the effect that Ofcom should behave reasonably. He argued that there is precedent for the use of the word, and I shall
 consider the suggestion, but I am cautious about adding too many statements that do not seem to be required.
 The hon. Gentleman also referred to the changes that the Government have made. He was right to point out that, under the Enterprise Act, Ministers are not involved in decisions on the references. That is an important strengthening of the competition framework for the British economy. He seems to be saying that he is in favour of that. In clause 356, we are simply carrying across provisions that have already been agreed for inclusion in the Enterprise Act and putting them in this legislation as well. The hon. Gentleman said that he had made similar points during the debate on the Enterprise Act and that they did not find favour. We now need to ensure that we carry across into the Bill the framework that Parliament has agreed. I take issue with the hon. Gentleman's assumption that people will launch investigations for which there is no evidence. That will not happen. Regulators would be reluctant to embark on a major exercise unless there were a significant reason for them to do so. It is important that, if there is evidence of a problem that falls short of a breach of competition law, it should be possible for action to be taken or an investigation to be carried out. These provisions permit that, as do similar provisions in the Enterprise Act that have been agreed by Parliament. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 356 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 357 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 358 - Application of the Competition Act 1998 to news provision

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Michael Fabricant: This is an important provision, although it is merely a technical amendment to the Broadcasting Act 1996. It is somewhat different from clauses 356 and 357 in that it seems—if the explanatory notes are correct—to restrict the powers of the Office of Fair Trading. Will the Minister explain the relationship of the clause to the operations of ITN or any other Channel 3 news provider?
 ITN has had its ups and downs. It is a major provider of television news, both in the United Kingdom and overseas, and it is to be congratulated on its recent launch of a 24-hour news service. It could be argued, however, that ITN would be unsustainable in a completely free market. I suspect that if ITV channels were free to choose national television news providers to operate as separate groups in ITV, they might not all choose to use ITN, not because there is anything wrong with ITN's editorial standards or content but because of the cost. I would argue that ITN provides remarkably good value for money, because the provision of any form of television news 
 is a costly business. It should also be remembered that, much like BBC news, ITN is not only a user of the wires—the tapes that are available from organisations such as Reuters—but includes major news gatherers and news agencies. Where does the Minister see the future of ITN with regard to Channel 3? How does he see clause 358 impinging on ITN? Will the clause primarily enshrine the role of ITN as the sole news provider to Channel 3? He will be aware that we discussed the ownership of Channel 3 on earlier parts of the Bill, and it is now conceivable that Channel 3 could be owned by an overseas organisation, which might be a news provider itself. That raises interesting questions. 
 If Channel 3 were taken over by News Corp Ltd. or, perhaps more likely, by an Italian or German news group, which was a news gather, what would be the position if the news group said, ''We are already news gatherers. We can provide our own news service to Channel 3 and we choose not to use ITN because that would duplicate television news provision.'' How would that relate to clause 358 and the role of the competitive market? Subsection (6) states: 
''In subsection (8) (notice by Office of Fair Trading to the Secretary of State)''—
 I presume that that is the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport. I look to the Minister for guidance, but none is forthcoming.

Andrew Lansley: Any Secretary of State? International Development?

Andrew Robathan: Defence?

Michael Fabricant: We need a little clarity. I assumed that it would be the Department of Trade and Industry or the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, perhaps even the Ministry of Defence. We can explore the various Departments, but the clause does not define which Secretary of State it is.
 The Secretary of State will be taking a view on whether or not it is in the public interest that a monopoly position be maintained. If Channel 3 were to be acquired by an overseas or a British organisation that was a news gatherer, but not including ITN, how would that impinge on the provisions of clause 358? Would the Secretary of State feel that it might be in conflict with the OFT? Might it be regarded as a monopoly position, or would the explanatory notes prevail? 
 I know that the explanatory notes do not have precedence over the Bill, but in this instance I find them particularly helpful. They state: 
''The Secretary of State is obliged to consult the OFT before making such declarations and to notify the OFT after making such declarations.''
 In particular, it says that the Secretary of State—I should say he or she, because we do not know which Department we are talking about— 
''may declare that any provisions in an agreement between regional Channel 3 licence holders for the appointment of the Channel 3 news provider are either not anti-competitive or, if anti-competitive, are proportionate to the objectives being achieved''.
 That means the provision of an effective news service primarily in competition with that provided by BBC television news. 
 I suggest that that might not be the objective of the Secretary of State or Ofcom, if the independent licence holders were owned by an overseas organisation that was itself a television news provider. What would be the role—I am tempted to say what would be the locus—of the clause in that instance?

Stephen Timms: I should first explain that the clause amends references in section 194A of the Broadcasting Act 1990 to the OFT, so that it refers to both OFT and Ofcom. It is being amended now because it is another aspect of the concurrent exercise of powers by both offices. The reasons for that were mentioned by the hon. Member for Lichfield when he spoke about the importance of the role of the news provider to Channel 3.
 The nominated news provider arrangements have been in place for a long time, to ensure that independent high-quality news is provided for ITV, the major free-to-air commercial TV channel. It does not have to be ITN; it could be any organisation that satisfies Ofcom that it is up to the necessary standard. However, all hon. Members would agree that some arrangements could, as the hon. Gentleman suggested, give rise to some concern, although it would depend on the details. We want to maintain the possibility of intervention, provided for by the Broadcasting Act 1990, to ensure that news is up to standard for Channel 3.

Michael Fabricant: I am interested in the point that the Minister is beginning to explore. He has pointed out the importance of the independent news provider, whoever that may be. Does the Minister believe that there would be cause for concern if that news provider were primarily based outside the UK, whatever the quality of the news provided?

Stephen Timms: I do not want to speculate about the issues that might arise in any particular case. The essential concern is with quality, which is at the heart of the arrangements that have been in place for a long time for the identification of a nominated news provider. The reason for the provisions is that some might argue that the arrangements are anti-competitive. I suspect that that would not be the case, but it could be argued. The clause is therefore needed to make it clear that the arrangement is not outside the law. The detail of how the nominated news provider arrangements work and the criteria that need to be satisfied are set out in clauses 271 to 274.
 On the question of foreign ownership, the heart of issue is the question of quality. That is the point on which Ofcom needs to satisfy itself. All of us would agree that that is appropriate for the reasons that have been outlined. The clause allows us to extend that long-standing arrangement, which we would all agree has worked well, into the new era in which both Ofcom and OFT have a role. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 358 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 359 and 360 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 361 - Newspaper public interest considerations

John Whittingdale: I beg to move amendment No.642, in
clause 361, page 311, line 4, leave out from first 'in' to 'the' and insert 
 'all media available to citizens of'.
 The amendment deals with a specific concern relating to newspaper interests. We have more general concerns that will be addressed when we debate the next two clauses. Our concern relates to the view of the market that is taken when considering merger proposals for newspapers. There has been a lot of discussion about multi-media convergence, and about the way that the different forms of media will over time come together. We have also been talking about the need to future-proof the Bill, in order that we do not have to revisit the legislation too rapidly in the future. Therefore, the purpose of the amendment is to recognise the fact that the market we are examining is changing rapidly—it has already been subject to great change and might well change further in coming years. 
 It is short-sighted that when we examine the plurality of views that we should restrict our examination to the newspaper market, rather than considering the media market as a whole. Newspaper circulation has been declining over the past decade. I believe that the figure for overall newspaper circulation has gone down by about 13 per cent. over the past 10 years. That is at least in part because of the growing market in alternative forms of news provision, entertainment or whatever else people have traditionally bought newspapers to obtain. When we consider the plurality of views, which the clause deals with, it is important that we should not restrict ourselves to newspapers only. Those views will be expressed through a variety of different means. We shall have local television stations and radio stations; we may have circulating magazines in a particular area; we shall have specialist interest publications; and, more and more, I suspect, the internet will supply views, comment and news. 
 When we come to test the question of whether plurality exists, it seems short-sighted to say that that consideration should simply apply to the newspaper market. 
 The purpose of the amendment is to extend the scope of any examination to account for all the different forms of media that are available to UK citizens, be that either a national investigation or an investigation of a local market. I hope that the Minister recognises that the amendment was moved in the spirit of the Bill. The Bill's purpose is to take into account rapidly changing technology and means of delivery. It seems to us that, quite soon, it will be inappropriate to focus on one specific aspect—the newspaper market. It would be more sensible for those considering whether there is adequate plurality of views to take into account all the different forms of media. It is not an enormous amendment, but it does raise a very important point that lies at the heart of the 
 justification for many of the measures that we debate today.

Stephen Timms: The hon. Member for Maldon and East Chelmsford has raised some interesting questions, and those questions will run through the entire debate on arrangements for newspapers.
 The existing special newspaper merger regime was contained in the Fair Trading Act 1973. However, it is interesting to look at how we got there. It all arose from the recommendations of the royal commission on the press in1961–62, and the general concern that the increasing concentration of newspaper ownership in too few hands could threaten freedom, variety of expression and opinion, and perhaps even the unbiased presentation of the news. Provisions in the Monopolies and Mergers Act 1965 and the 1973 Act arose from the royal commission's recommendations. In several cases since then, that legislation has enabled successive Governments to prevent newspaper acquisitions that would been against the public interest. 
 A simple question that will underpin the whole debate on the next few clauses is whether Parliament still believes that there is something special about newspapers. It is perfectly possible to make the argument, as the hon. Member for Maldon and East Chelmsford started to do, that there is no longer anything special about newspapers, given the plethora of media channels. That may be the position that the hon. Gentleman advances. 
 My response is that there is still a very special place for newspapers in opinion forming in Britain. Therefore, we still need special arrangements for newspaper mergers. That is at the heart of the debate that we shall have on the next few clauses, so it is helpful to raise that key issue right at the start. The Committee must take a view on it. 
 New section 58(2A), to be inserted into the Enterprise Act, refers to the need for 
''accurate presentation of the news''
 and ''free expression of opinion''. New section 58(2B), which amendment No. 642 targets, specifies 
''The need for, to the extent that it is reasonable and practicable, a plurality of views in newspapers in each market for newspapers in the United Kingdom or a part of the United Kingdom''.
 The plurality of views and opinion in newspapers continues to be an important public interest. Newspapers are opinion formers. Despite all the changes of the past 40 years, they still play a particular and critical role in the political process. The Government are committed, in the Bill, to continue to protect the public interests that can arise in newspaper mergers. In one respect, the newspaper industry is alone among the mainstream media—the others being television, radio and satellite broadcasting. It does not require licences from an independent media authority in order to operate and it never will. It is a by-product of licensing in those other media that plurality can be assured through limits on the control of licences. Only through the operation of the special newspaper public interest divisions can 
 transactions that might give rise to plurality concerns be investigated. If we remove that safeguard, we shall lose an important ability—which successive Governments have taken advantage of—to protect the public interest.

Michael Fabricant: I am following the Minister's argument and I agree with him. As he points out, the licences within ITV, regardless of ownership, ensure that that there are different editorial provisions regarding local news and so on. Would he not acknowledge that even within a particular news group, the members might not speak with one voice? I give the example of News Corporation. The Sun has a very different editorial policy from, say, The Sunday Times, particularly in its political viewpoint, as does The Times. The News of the World has a different tone and political allegiance again. Can the Minister confirm that he is not falling into the trap of saying that single ownership of newspapers necessarily means that all of those newspapers will speak with a single voice?

Stephen Timms: I can confirm that I am not falling into the trap. Equally, the hon. Gentleman will agree that newspaper mergers can give rise to concerns in that area. Therefore, we need to continue to have an ability to address public interest issues that arise from mergers when they are proposed.

Chris Bryant: The hon. Member for Lichfield might have a point in relation to national newspapers, whose ownership is widely known. However, in a local newspaper regime, people might not know that all of their local newspapers are owned by the same organisation and that they have joint editorial meetings. That is why it is important to have a public interest safeguard.

Stephen Timms: I agree. When we come to the clauses that deal specifically with the ownership of local newspapers, the case will be made that we should not apply a public interest test. I shall argue—as my hon. Friend has done—that it is important, for his reasons and others, to maintain the ability to apply a public interest test in the case of local newspapers.
 It has been a longstanding approach to recognise that newspapers, nationally and locally, are opinion formers. The amendment would require the Secretary of State, when considering the impact of a newspaper merger, to consider whether the merger had any impact on the plurality of views expressed in all media. That would dilute the impact of the provisions. We need to protect the newspaper industry, because newspapers continue to play a special role.

Mark Hoban: Does the Minister not accept that the importance that he is ascribing to newspapers has diminished in recent years as newspapers have changed their role and their content? They are more feature based and less news based, and feature far less opinion and much more celebrity.

Stephen Timms: We could have an interesting debate about whether newspapers are less influential in the formation of current opinion than they were 30 or 40 years ago; I am not certain that they are. However, there have been changes, some of which the hon. Gentleman has described. My view is that newspapers
 continue to play a significant part in influencing the formation of opinion. I shall no doubt rehearse that point at some length as we debate the clauses.

Mark Hoban: Allied to the fact that the role of newspapers in forming people's views has diminished is the fact that their circulation has decreased—in many cases, significantly—and their readership has, therefore, declined. They do not occupy the same privileged place that they did in the 1960s.

Peter Atkinson: Order. Before the Minister responds, may I indicate to the Committee that I am happy to have a clause stand part debate? The amendment is quite narrow, so we could perhaps dispose of it and move on to the stand part debate in which the issues that have been raised quite properly could be dealt with even better.

Stephen Timms: In response to the hon. Member for Fareham (Mr. Hoban), it is true that there are many examples of newspaper circulations having risen. Who knows what further changes there will be in the years ahead? It is clear that at the moment newspapers continue to play a special part, which is not radically different from the part that they played 40 years ago and which is sufficient to require a public interest test to be applied.
 The amendment would bring cross-media ownership issues under the ambit of the special public interest intervention process. Other provisions in the Bill deal with issues arising from cross-media ownership and we should not bring those in to the special newspaper merger control regime of the Enterprise Act. We will debate that in respect of later amendments. On this amendment, introducing such a cross-media public interest test indirectly through the newspaper merger regime would be inappropriate. The central issue is whether we should continue to have the special arrangement in respect of newspapers. I think that we should.

John Whittingdale: The Minister is right. Although the amendment is narrow, it is based on an important factor that will influence much of our consideration of this chapter. The Minister's case is, as I understand it, that newspapers are still special and therefore they deserve exceptional provisions. That may or may not still be the case. He said that the circulation of some newspapers is increasing and that the circulation of others is decreasing—that is obvious. I bow to the hon. Member for Rhondda (Mr. Bryant) and I give him the chance to be recorded in the Hansard report of our debate for saying that his local newspaper, the Rhondda Leader, has enjoyed a rise in its circulation.

Chris Bryant: Despite my column.

John Whittingdale: Yes. Nevertheless, the overall circulation of newspapers is falling and that is to some extent inevitable, given that there are so many more different ways to obtain news and comment. That situation will continue and we will soon be in a position to receive news and all kinds of things through mobile phones and other devices. The unique position that has been held by newspapers is therefore under threat. We have said that we must ensure that the Bill takes account of future technological developments, and there is a strong
 case for reflecting that at this stage. If we were to make our amendment, I assume that that would not prevent the Secretary of State from saying that it is plain that newspapers are still the most influential voice in this market. It is right that we should try to ensure that plurality exists in the newspaper market. That would not be excluded by the amendment. The amendment would mean that if it were plain that other voices and other views were expressed through different media outlets, that should be taken into account.
 We shall press the amendment as a matter of principle and to flag up the fact that it is important. 
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 11.

Question accordingly negatived. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

John Whittingdale: I want to explore another aspect of the clause—one that could probably occupy us for the rest of the day although I shall not stray too far down that road. The clause says that the first public interest consideration should be
''The need for . . . accurate presentation of news''.
 Accurate presentation of news is a subjective issue. What some people consider to be accurate presentation of news might be regarded by other people as an appallingly biased and ill-informed account of the state of affairs. A symptom of my fear is that if we stray on to the issue of public interest, we are in danger of beginning to interfere with the freedom of the press. 
 My first worry, which is more obvious, is whether accurate presentation of news is actually necessary. [Laughter.] The hon. Member for Rhondda mocks, but let me give him an example. He will recall headlines in the Daily Sport such as ''Elvis found living on the moon''. Most people would probably believe that that was not accurate presentation of news.

Andrew Robathan: What?

John Whittingdale: I am sorry to break that to my hon. Friend; I should try to do so sensitively and fairly.
 Part of the appeal of several newspapers—the Daily Sport is the most obvious example—is the fact that they carry highly entertaining stories that most people realise are not wholly true. Such newspapers do not claim to do otherwise, but because they fall in the definition of newspapers, the Secretary of State would 
 presumably, accordingly to the clause, have to consider whether there was accurate presentation of news in the event of a bid to take over the Daily Sport. I do not know the full truth behind the ''Freddie Starr ate my hamster'' story. That, too, may not have been a fully accurate presentation of a news story; nevertheless it was one of the most successful headlines that The Sun has produced. It has passed into public mythology. Therefore the question whether we need accurate presentation of news is slightly less obvious than it would seem to be at first sight.

Chris Bryant: It is a delight to hear a former Conservative spin doctor arguing that the truth is not necessarily important in the presentation of news. I remember writing an article for The Times that was subsequently used in an American newspaper. When the American newspaper was about to print it, it checked every fact. The Times never checked a single fact. Does the hon. Gentleman think that there should be a greater burden on British newspapers to check their facts before they publish?

John Whittingdale: First, I deny vigorously the accusation that I was ever a spin doctor. That is an invention of this Government. I am proud to have worked as a political secretary and a special adviser, but Mr. Alastair Campbell has taken the definition of spin doctor to new heights and I would never have fallen into that category. I occasionally assisted journalists in understanding the arguments and principles lying behind Government policy, but that was a different thing.
 Secondly, and more importantly, the hon. Gentleman asked whether The Times has the same standards when checking facts as American newspapers. I do not know whether that is the case or not, but if a newspaper is bought because it has a reputation for accuracy and objectivity in its presentation of news and readers discover that that reputation is no longer as solid as it once was, they will buy another newspaper and that will happen rapidly.

Michael Fabricant: On the point that was made by the hon. Member for Rhondda, does my hon. Friend agree that op-ed material is not news? Does he further care to speculate that the reason why the American newspapers were checking on the facts was not so much because they wanted to present news that was factually correct to their readers, but because of the fear of litigation that is still much stronger in the United States than it is in the United Kingdom?

John Whittingdale: I am not sure whether that is correct, although I bow to my hon. Friend's superior knowledge of the matter. It may well be the case, but it is certainly a fact that in this country one of the key reasons—I am grateful to the hon. Member for Rhondda for having highlighted the fact—why newspapers are not the same as other means of communication that we have been dealing with in the rest of the Bill is that there is nothing to stop anyone starting up a newspaper. Indeed, the Minister made that point in his response to our debate on the previous amendment. To start up a newspaper does
 not require a licence and therefore there is a much more open market.
 Newspapers will come into being if it were felt that the existing newspapers are not providing a sufficient diversity or standard of accuracy. The Independent is a case in point. It is a national newspaper that was launched particularly because the existing newspapers did not cater for the section of the market that was unaligned and which was looking for objectivity and impartiality. Whether it has achieved that objective is another matter.

Chris Bryant: As far as I can tell, the hon. Gentleman is arguing that the market will provide accuracy. If someone reads a newspaper and finds that it is not accurate, he will stop buying it, but there is no evidence of that happening. Readers of all the tabloid newspapers cheerfully admit that the newspapers are not accurate, but they still continue to buy them. It is not so much a question of facts alone, but many newspapers have whole articles built deliberately to create big headlines that will increase sales without a single attributed quote or a single fact in them.

John Whittingdale: The hon. Gentleman says that there is no evidence, so I shall give him some. I believe that The Times has become a mouthpiece of the Government. It swallows the line given by Downing street and reproduces it without criticism or comment. As a result, I have stopped buying it.

Andrew Robathan: I stopped buying The Times long before the Government came to power. Is not the proof that The Times so willingly took the article from the hon. Member for Rhondda without checking it?

John Whittingdale: I did not see the article.

Andrew Robathan: It was 12 years ago.

Michael Fabricant: The hon. Gentleman was a Conservative then.

John Whittingdale: Before you intervene to pull me back on course, Mr. Atkinson—

Peter Atkinson: No, I am enjoying it.

John Whittingdale: I will try to use the lunch break to find the article by the hon. Member for Rhondda so that we can make a judgment. However, there is another serious point. The hon. Gentleman said that people go on buying the tabloids even though they know that they are not necessarily accurate, which bears out my point. When one buys a broadsheet, one expects a level of accuracy that goes beyond certain tabloids. I gave examples of stories in the Daily Sport and The Sun that were printed for their entertainment value not because they were necessarily an accurate reflection of the complete position.

Brian White: The Joint Committee was shown a quote from the Daily Mail that suggested that it was no longer possible to see where factual reporting ends and opinion starts. Is not one of the problems causing the decline in newspapers that they are increasingly concerned with opinion rather than facts and the accurate interpretation of news?

John Whittingdale: I do not disagree with the hon. Gentleman, but, to return to the clause, are these
 matters for the Secretary of State to take into account when considering newspaper acquisitions?

Andrew Lansley: The hon. Member for Milton Keynes, North-East (Brian White) touched on the Joint Committee's proposal, but the Joint Committee was talking about a test of plurality for accurate presentation of news and free expression of opinion—and a clear differentiation between the two. Would the hon. Gentleman agree with me rather than with the Joint Committee that merger control procedures should be about absolute issues of ownership and not used as a lever with which to try to exercise continuing control over the editorial content of newspapers?

John Whittingdale: I agree absolutely, completely and 100 per cent. with my hon. Friend. The matter will be at the heart of the debate over this and coming clauses. There is a concern about the whole thrust of the clauses dealing with newspaper mergers. There is a danger that, in ostensibly considering the matters of competition involved in mergers and acquisitions, the Secretary of State could open a door for Government interference in editorial content and the presentation of news. The concern is widely felt and my hon. Friend is entirely right to flag it up at this point.

Stephen Timms: I am anxious that we should clearly understand the hon. Gentleman's position. Is he saying that the special regime for newspapers that has been in place for some 40 years is no longer needed and that there should no longer be special arrangements surrounding the merger of newspapers?

John Whittingdale: An argument can be made for that, but I will not advance it today. One could put forward an intellectual argument for newspapers to be treated on competition grounds, like other commodities. Nevertheless, the Minister's point is that newspapers have an influence that perhaps requires that they have special treatment. Therefore, if we apply special provisions to newspapers that go beyond those applicable in more general competition issues, we must build in strong safeguards. We must be clear which issues are legitimate for the Government to consider. The issue of the plurality of views, which goes beyond the general competition point, is legitimate, and that is why my amendment to the clause would not have struck out new section 52(2B) of the Enterprise Act, but would instead have widened the definition. Plurality is a relevant issue.

Michael Fabricant: While my hon. Friend considers whether to advance the proposition that there should be no competition controls, may I add that 40 years ago the vast majority of people took their news from newspapers? The current estimate is that only 11 per cent. of the population get their news from newspapers. The majority get news not even from radio, but from television. As a consequence, the ownership of newspapers is now far less important than it was 40 years ago, when the rules were originally put in place.

John Whittingdale: I agree—that is an important point that refers back, to some extent, to our earlier debate on plurality and to the need to take account
 more widely of the media as a whole. My hon. Friend is right that the market will continue to change, and the chances are that the figure for newspapers' share of the market in news will go on falling.

Brian White: Is it not also true that some television news programmes use newspapers to set the agenda for the topics that they discuss?

John Whittingdale: That is a reason why we in this place spend so much time talking to newspaper journalists. We do not think that we are influencing only those who buy newspapers, as in that case it probably would not make a great deal of difference to the results of general elections. The hon. Gentleman is right. It has always been the view that opinions expressed in the daily papers go on to influence news scheduling and coverage and the priorities set by the broadcasters. The ''Today'' programme is clearly an example of that. I was not saying that newspapers are not important, or will not continue to be. However, for the reasons that my hon. Friend the Member for South Cambridgeshire gave—and we will return to them later—it is all the more important that we are clear as to what are the legitimate concerns that the Government should take into account when examining newspapers.

Andrew Lansley: May I take my hon. Friend back to his point about the accurate presentation of news? When he referred to the Daily Sport and The Sun, I anticipated that he would make a distinction between the two. David Sullivan's proposed acquisition of the Bristol Evening Post in 1990 is a case in point on the accurate presentation of news. That was about the character of the owner, in this case David Sullivan, who owns the Daily Sport. That is in distinction to a newspaper such as The Sun, as the character of the owner is such that it would not necessarily be thought to prejudice the accurate presentation of news.

John Whittingdale: The character of the owner is important, and we shall certainly want to come to that issue, but we will probably do so under the next clause or the clause following that. I was merely considering the news stories carried in the papers. I am grateful to my hon. Friend, because I would not like it to be said that I am suggesting that The Sun and the Daily Sport are the same.
 The Sun is a great newspaper, or rather a news paper. It occasionally carries extremely entertaining stories that are perhaps not so obviously news, but most of its readers know the difference between the two. The Freddie Starr story I mentioned is plainly an example of one such stories. I believe that the Daily Sport carries some news, but one has to look very hard to find it, but I am not sure, because I do not look at it. None the less, people do not buy the Daily Sport to find out what is going on in the world—or if they do, they are sadly disappointed.

Chris Bryant: But is not the plurality issue essential to the accuracy of news? Many people read more than one newspaper. In fact, evidence suggests that most people who read a newspaper read at least two or three. There is the synoptic problem, in that if three newspapers come to the same conclusion, and print the same supposed facts, on a story, we might assume that
 it is reliable. However, it might turn out that there was only one source for that story, because there was only one news gathering operation that was organised by a single media conglomerate. If one were made aware of that, one might not attribute the same accuracy and credibility to that information.

John Whittingdale: What has usually happened is that one unnamed Cabinet Minister has had lunch with three lobby journalists.
 The hon. Gentleman made another interesting point: one might be faced with a contradiction. It could be argued that if a single news story is interpreted in three different ways—perhaps even contradictory ways, which does happen—that represents the kind of plurality of views in newspapers that we are seeking to achieve in new subsection (2B). However, it might also be argued that that would contradict the need for accurate presentation of news that is stipulated in new subsection (2A). That is all in the eye of the beholder. 
 Seeking to ensure accurate presentation of news is a very worthy cause that I think that all of us would sign up to, but when we get down to the specifics, one person's notion of accurate presentation is very different from another's. This is an intensely political area, and I am concerned that this clause and subsequent clauses might begin to open the door to interference in newspaper content that is political and of a kind that most people in this country would wish to avoid.

Michael Fabricant: I share my hon. Friend's concern. I wish to put on the record my gratitude to the official or officials who wrote the explanatory notes because they are very helpful. The notes point out:
''Currently, only national security is a specified consideration.''
 I think that all of us would agree that D notices should be issued with respect to national security, particularly at these troubled times, but I would be very concerned if we were ever to find a situation developing in which D notices or something similar were issued to newspapers because of the perceived accuracy of the presentation of news. 
 We have only a few minutes left, so I will be very brief. Who will make the analysis? Who will those individuals be? With regard to the interpretation of the ''accurate presentation of news'' there is a huge danger. It is interesting that that requirement immediately precedes paragraph (b), which talks about the ''free expression of opinion''. 
 The old Independent Broadcasting Authority had very strict rules for television and radio and that was carried forward into the Independent Television Commission and the Radio Authority: there should be a clear demarcation between news and opinion. Does the Minister envisage that Ofcom might say at some point in the future, ''There needs to be a clear demarcation''? When sophisticated people read newspapers they understand what is op-ed—editorial and opinion—and what is hard news, but it could be argued that unsophisticated people do not understand that distinction. 
 The hon. Member for Rhondda raised some interesting questions and his probing points should be thought about. I do not share his view that there is always the same editorial team within a certain newspaper group, because even in the local press there is often competition between the daily and weekly editions. He also raises the valid point about what is the source of news. Does the Minister envisage that there might be daily intervention by Ofcom over these issues?

Chris Bryant: At present, most groups would not think of combining their editorial teams, and they would not decide to combine their news gathering teams. There are separate correspondents in Parliament for The Sun, The Times, the News of the World, and so on. If, as a result of a merger, it were likely that the news gathering and/or editorial teams of several national newspapers would be combined, that would be a legitimate concern.

Michael Fabricant: Yes, but is it not also a matter of concern that many of the smaller newspapers—and even the bigger newspaper groups that are cutting back—are more dependent than ever before on single sources such as the Press Association or Reuters? It could be argued that the Press Association supplies accurate news—and I would suggest that it has a good reputation for accuracy—but that news is from a single source, nevertheless.

John Whittingdale: Will my hon. Friend give way?

Michael Fabricant: No, because I wish to conclude my remarks before 11.25 am. I want to put on the record that although I understand why new subsection (2A) has been added, it is a source of concern as it may well be abused in the future.
 It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. 
 Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock.